100 The Solari Report / 2018 Annual Wrap Up / Part Two I estimate Dillon’s total profits for their stock investment in Cornell to have been $6.7 million for Dillon employees who invested and $19.4 million for the investors in Dillon’s funds, which also included Dillon officers and directors. This represented an annual return on investment of approximately 35-45%. These are the kind of profits you get when you buy stock for a price of $3.8 million and several years later sell that stock for $29.9 million—or an almost 800% increase on your investment. In addition, I estimate that Dillon also generated at least $6 million in fees for investment banking and investment advisor services. This results in an estimated total of $32.1 million in profits for Dillon, its leaders and its investors over a seven-year period. I remember reading some of the Carlyle Group’s marketing material about their success in leveraged buyouts of companies that did lots of contracts and business with the federal government. They claimed to have achieved annual investment returns of 35%, in the range of the returns that I estimate Dillon to have made on Cornell Corrections. If you understand the story of Cornell Corrections, you will get a good understanding of the type of investment that achieves 35% invest- ment returns for private investors on the stocks of companies that enjoy growth in government contracts and the fruits of “privatization.” It is imperative in understanding investments like these to look not just at the companies involved, but to look through to the individuals who make the criti- cal decisions. In Dillon Read’s case, the key leaders were also personal investors. We do not know if, as sometimes happens in cases like this, the firm financed or arranged financing for their purchases in an arrangement where, in essence, they can buy for “no money down.” An estimate of their personal profits is as follows: Estimated Personal Profits of Seven Largest Dillon Direct Investors* including footnotes